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david hofmann:planning and building successful risk management systems  |
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by Poornima Subramanian, May-June 2009 |
"You were involved in the organizational changes that were instituted at NASA after the Columbia accident. An organizational and safety culture survey instrument developed by you played a major role in the changes. Could you elaborate on the instrument and the changes that were instituted?
I was indirectly involved in the changes at NASA post Columbia. Let me first give you a bit of the background. NASA set up the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to investigate the events and causes that culminated in the disintegration of the shuttle and the death of its seven-crew members. The findings of the board found NASA’s workplace safety culture as the primary contributing factor to the disaster. More than a year after the Columbia accident, workers at NASA reported that they were still afraid to speak up about safety concerns and did not feel management appreciated it. Responding to this feedback, NASA initiated an effort to fix the organization’s safety climate and contracted the California based Behavioral Science Technology (BST) to help drive this cultural change.
The NASA survey revealed that employees felt reluctant or fearful to bring problems with safety implications to the attention of management. Among the lowest scoring categories in the survey were ‘perceived organizational support’ and ‘upward communication’. "
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